The Moral Psychology of Compassion by Caouette Justin

Author:Caouette, Justin
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: undefined
Publisher: National Book Network International
Published: 2012-02-28T16:00:00+00:00

Compassion, Imagination, and Abstraction

In MM Kant not only defends an indirect duty to cultivate proximal compassion, but also insists that we should not shun places where proximal compassion is elicited, such as hospitals and prisons, that is, places where we are expected to meet destitute humanity: “It is therefore a duty not to avoid the places where the poor who lack the most basic necessities are to be found, but rather to seek them out, and not to shun sickrooms or debtor’s prisons and so forth in order to avoid sharing painful feelings one may not be able to resist” (MM 6, 457).

This passage should be enough to respond to Adorno’s objection that Kant’s ethics is indifferent to the vulnerability of human nature, even though Adorno is right that Kant’s perspective is not defined by pathogenic circumstantial vulnerability. The reason is not that his normative standards are set by idealized pure rationality, but that he provides a forward-looking account of rational deliberation that prescribes how to act, rather than a backward-looking account of moral judgment for assessing the merits of past action. Still it is an ethics capable of detecting wrongs against humanity, among which are failures to protect the vulnerable. Still, I doubt that the implication is that being overwhelmed by natural feeling of compassion is a good thing. It is not. But the reason why it is not should be explained by lack of freedom, rather than by the painfulness of such feelings. The point is that if one is overcome by feelings one is not in command of oneself, hence does not act under the representation of freedom.[37] This is the sense of Kant’s claim that one should not “be infected [anstecken] by [another’s] pain” (MM 6, 457).

Kant urges us that we should not be afraid of exposing ourselves to the pain of seeing others suffering; on the contrary, by cultivating such natural feelings of compassion in proximity with suffering helps us understand what we ought to do to relieve others from suffering (Baron 1995, 220).[38] A well-disposed agent may not have the exact cognition of what the duty to assist others in need is, until she meets the eye of the other in an asylum, a pediatric oncology pavilion, or an immigration camp. When cultivated, these feelings can help us to notice when someone needs help.

Perhaps one other worry in addition to passivity is that overwhelming suffering may be paralyzing. An agent overwhelmed by compassionate feelings so as to be paralyzed is somebody whose status as agent is undermined. This is no different from claiming that she lacks freedom, hence activity. Indeed, there might be kinds of suffering that are self-shattering, where mourning and grieving is more appropriate than doing or where atonement cannot be performative. As with so-called expressive action, these are not counterexamples to Kant’s theory: they fall outside the scope of agency, but this is not to say that they have no rationale or moral value. Kant’s point is not that we should remain cold observers in the face of hideous crimes.

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